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Abstract
We conducted an artefactual field experiment in Vietnam to investigate whether and 
how experiencing a natural disaster affects individual attitudes toward risks. Using 
experimental and real household data, we show that households in villages affected 
by a flood in recent years exhibit more risk aversion, compared with individuals 
living in similar but unaffected villages. Interestingly, this result holds for the loss 
domain, but not the gain domain. In line with Prospect Theory, Vietnamese house-
holds distort probabilities. The distortion is related to aid received and social net-
works participation, but is unrelated to flood experience.
Keywords Risk preferences · Non-expected utility · Flood · Vietnam · Field 
experiment
JEL CODES D9 · Q54 · Q56 · C93
1 Introduction
Most real-life choices entail risk or uncertainty and are therefore partly determined 
by the risk preferences of the decision-makers. Recent empirical research has shown 
that the way individuals make choices under risk may change when they experi-
ence a shock such as a natural disaster (Cameron and Shah 2015; Said et al. 2015; 
Cassar et  al. 2017). This is an important issue given the increasing prevalence of 
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environmental shocks, especially in developing countries. In Vietnam, floods are 
frequent and socially costly accounting for 49% of total economic losses due to 
natural disasters (WorldBank 2005). Vietnamese households are especially hurt by 
floods, as they have very limited access to insurance mechanisms. Aside from their 
obvious economic effects, floods can have overlooked long-lasting consequences if 
they impact decisions under risk. Climate change is expected to increase the inten-
sity and frequency of floods (Hirabayashi et al. 2013). Market insurance for flood is 
largely not available and therefore cannot be a substitute for self-insurance (Ehrlich 
and Becker 1972). In this context, self-protection and self-insurance strategies are 
both especially important and dependent on risk attitudes (Dionne and Eeckhoudt 
1985). One could thus design more efficient prevention, protection and emergency 
policies if one had more accurate information on how individuals make decisions 
after experiencing floods.
The object of this paper is to assess the precise, medium- to long-term, impact 
on risk preferences of experiencing a flood in the past 5 years in Vietnam. To do so, 
we collected incentivized experimental and survey data, which is detailed enough to 
study potential mediating factors. To obtain a more detailed picture of how decisions 
under risk may change, we allow for Prospect Theory preferences: choices are made 
in the gain and the loss domains and subjective weighting of probabilities is consid-
ered. We account for different measures of flood experience as well as for expecta-
tions about future flooding, social involvement and formal aid, that may all mediate 
the impact of a disaster on risk preferences.
1.1  Disasters and preferences
The impact of experiencing natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions) on risk attitudes has been the object of recent empirical research (Eckel et al. 
2009; Andrabi and Das 2010; Li et al. 2011a; Ali Bchir and Willinger 2013; Page 
et al. 2014; Cameron and Shah 2015; Said et al. 2015; Cassar et al. 2017). Impacts 
on time preferences (Li et al. 2011; Ali Bchir and Willinger 2013; Callen 2015; Cas-
sar et al. 2017) and on social preferences (Cassar et al. 2017; Becchetti et al. 2017) 
have also been explored. Though causality is difficult to establish, several of these 
studies suggest that exposed individuals have their preferences lastingly changed. 
The literature is however not fully conclusive as we discuss in the next section.
Existing studies do not distinguish risk taking in the gain and the loss domains, 
except for a study in psychology (Li et al. 2011a). This is, however, an especially 
meaningful distinction: economic studies show that individuals tend to be averse to 
risk for gains but not for losses (Schoemaker 1990; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; 
Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui et al. 2008) so that shocks may potentially have a dif-
ferent impact for gains and losses. Besides the neuroscience literature has shown 
that decision-making under risk in the gain and the loss domains rely on different 
neural structures associated to emotions (Levin et al. 2012; Weller et al. 2007). The 
impact of a salient and emotional event such as a flood may therefore be different for 
losses, which activate stronger emotional reactions.
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1.2  Identifying the mechanisms at play
A natural disaster may either actually change risk preferences, or only change atti-
tudes. Preferences are fundamental features that refer to an underlying taste of the 
individual, while attitudes are derived from the choices made by the individual (that 
depend on both taste and circumstances), Weber and Ancker (2010).1
Preferences may actually change if the way the cognitive and the emotional sys-
tems are involved in decision-making are modified by the environmental shock 
(Loewenstein et al. 2001). After a trauma, individuals may put a higher weight on 
emotions (Eckel et al. 2009).
However, behaviors may change after a disaster (in the absence of a preference 
change) due to a changed perception of the background risk or to wealth effects. 
Background risk refers to some unavoidable risk that affects an individual who con-
siders a decision that involves another, independent, risk (Kimball 1993). The exper-
imental tasks that are used to elicit risk preferences, bear on monetary risks given 
an (unknown to the experimenter) environment with which the subject interacts. An 
apparent change in risk preferences may actually be due to a change in the individu-
al’s perception of the other risks present in his environment. Changes in risk percep-
tion after a natural disaster have been highly documented, especially in the context 
of floods (Bubeck et al. 2012; Ho et al. 2008; Knuth et al. 2014). A natural disaster 
may constitute a shock that contains new information, causing a rational update in 
estimates of background risk (Cameron and Shah 2015). Depending on the structure 
of individuals preferences, the change in background risk may then lead to more or 
less cautious behaviors (Gollier and Pratt 1996; Quiggin 2003; Beaud and Willinger 
2015). Last, experiencing a flood could change wealth. If a respondent is poorer or 
if he expects a higher background risk (e.g., another flood) after being flooded, then 
his choices may change even if his underlying preferences do not.
While one would need extremely detailed data to definitely solve the identifica-
tion problem described above, our data will allow us to get more insight about the 
different possible effects at play.
1.3  Our approach and methods
Beyond asserting the existence, or absence, of an impact of disaster on risk prefer-
ences, several points deserve more analysis and are the object of this article: Are 
monetary odds weighted differently after the experience of the disaster? If there is 
an impact of disaster experience, is it of the same magnitude for risks implying gains 
than for risks implying losses? And are preferences truly modified, or is the impact 
on attitudes towards risks solely due to changing risk perceptions about natural risks 
or to wealth effects?
1 The question of whether preferences or only attitudes are changed also refers to the notion of condi-
tional and unconditional preference stability. In our context, the environment of an individual is much 
changed after a disaster so that we cannot discuss unconditional stability. But we do attempt to identify 
more precisely some potential mediators of a change in choices.
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To address the various aspects mentioned, we gather detailed data from represent-
ative, randomly selected households located in a Vietnamese province affected by 
severe flooding. Our data includes incentivized lotteries, some in the gain domain, 
others in the loss domain, which are standard risk games using real money. We then 
combine our experimental measurement of risk attitude (decontextualized lottery 
choices) with real data on flooding experience.2 Our detailed data allows to account 
for different measures of flood experience and to control for a range of factors that 
include involvement in social networks and aid received from various sources.
A novelty of our approach is to allow for a non-expected utility representation—a 
prospect theory (PT) framework. Most existing empirical studies constrain prefer-
ences to follow the expected utility (EU) model. Under the PT framework, we can 
provide a more precise description of the impact of experiencing a disaster on risk 
preferences, isolating different dimensions (gains, losses, probability distortion). 
This impact is not restricted to be the same for gains and losses, in particular.
In addition, our measures of both personal and indirect experience, and of per-
ceived flood risk, help provide more insight into the sources of any preference 
change. Our data allows distinguishing personal experience of a flood, expectations 
about future damages (which measure an individual perception of the background 
risk) and village-level experience (which is another, objective and history-based, 
measure of background risk). Our results point to a very different impact of these 
measures on risk taking. Interestingly, we can measure whether personal experience 
has an impact once either of the two measures of background risk are taken into 
account. These results are important for adequately designing public aid, prevention 
and public or private insurance contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 provides some 
more information on floods in Vietnam and on the existing literature about disasters 
and preferences. Section 3 describes the experimental design used for eliciting indi-
vidual risk preferences. We discuss our data sources in Sect. 4, and our identifica-
tion strategy and results in Sect. 5. Section 6 presents robustness checks and Sect. 7 
concludes.
2  Context and literature
2.1  Flood risk in Vietnam
Vietnam ranks fourth in the World, after India, Bangladesh and China, in terms of 
population affected by flood each year.3 Vietnam indeed receives heavy rain during 
the monsoon season (from 1200 to 3000 mm, nearly 90% of which occur in sum-
mer). In addition, 6 to 8 typhoons hit the Vietnamese coasts every year on aver-
age. The combination of typhoon and monsoon seasons defines the flooding season 
2 Other works combining experimental measures of risk preferences with real decisions include Azevedo 
et al. (2003), Brunette et al. (2017).
3 See https ://www.wri.org/resou rces/data-sets/aqued uct-globa l-flood -risk-count ry-ranki ngs.
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which usually starts in July and ends in November. It is particularly costly since 70% 
of the population lives in coastal areas, usually only a few meters above sea level 
(Mai et al. 2009).
Flood management policies in Vietnam have been historically dominated by 
structural measures such as building dikes or dams, even if a recent move towards 
non-structural approaches, such as population education and preparedness, warning 
systems and insurance mechanisms has been observed (Pilarczyk and Nuoi 2005).
The Vietnamese market for life and non-life insurance only represented 1.5% of 
GDP in 2011 (compared to 5.8% on average in Asia) (SwissRe 2012). Coverage for 
natural catastrophe perils is usually included in property insurance policies, but sub-
scriptions to property insurance remain very limited in urban areas, and almost non-
existent in rural areas (WorldBank 2010). Catastrophic agricultural insurance is also 
extremely uncommon. According to the Vietnamese Finance Ministry, only 1% of 
farmers are currently insured against damage to crops. Government disaster relief 
payments are often the only source of compensation received by farmers after major 
floods or storms (WorldBank 2010).
2.2  Risk preferences and natural disasters: empirical evidence
There is a now a large empirical literature looking at how preferences are impacted 
by extreme events such as natural disasters. It is however not fully conclusive.
Some studies document more risk seeking in the gain domain after experiencing 
a natural disaster. These include Eckel et al. (2009) for evacuees from hurricane Kat-
rina, in its immediate aftermath; Ali Bchir and Willinger (2013) for poor Peruvian 
households exposed to a volcanic threat; Said et al. (2015) for flooded households in 
Pakistan; and Page et al. (2014) for flooded households in Australia.
However, other studies document more risk-averse behaviors following a disaster. 
They include Andrabi and Das (2010) for Pakistanese living close to an earthquake 
fault line; Cameron and Shah (2015) for Indonesian people after floods or earth-
quakes; Cassar et al. (2017) for Thai individuals affected by the 2004 tsunami; and 
Samphantharak and Chantarat (2015) for Thai exposed to the 2011 mega flood.
Lastly, a few studies report no significant relationship between risk attitudes 
and disaster experience. Callen (2015) documents no change in risk preferences 
for workers in Sri Lanka having experienced the 2004 Asian tsunami. Voors et al. 
(2012) report that shocks such as drought and excess rainfall do not significantly 
impact risk preferences in Burundi, while exposure to violent conflict does.
As discussed in Chuang and Schechter (2015), the lack of consistency in these 
results suggests that there may be issues involved in the experience of a natural dis-
aster that have not been considered yet in the existing studies, or that experimental 
choices are too noisy.
To get a better understanding of the complex relationship between risk prefer-
ences and experiencing a natural disaster, we collect detailed data and follow two 
directions. First, we consider risk preferences in the gain domain but also in the loss 
domain. Second, we allow for preferences following prospect theory. Both directions 
appear especially relevant given the existing literature on preferences under risk.
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2.3  Separating gains and losses
To our best knowledge, Li et al. (2011a) is the only study (in psychology) having con-
sidered a differentiated impact in the loss and in the gain domain of having experienced 
natural disasters (a heavy snow-hit and a major earthquake in China in 2008). Their 
results suggest that people tend to give more weight to low probabilities after a disas-
ter, preferring a sure loss (less risk seeking in loss domain) but a probable gain (less 
risk aversion in gain domain). These results were, however, obtained with hypothetical 
choices, without any structural estimation of risk preferences. Separating the loss and 
gain domains in the context of a shock may matter since decision-making under risk in 
the gain and the loss domains involves different psychological processes, and relies on 
different neural structures (Levin et al. 2012; Weller et al. 2007).
A large literature in experimental economics (Schoemaker 1990; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992; Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui et  al. 2008) also finds support for 
stronger risk aversion in the gain than in the loss domain. Under cumulative pros-
pect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) the value function is concave for gains 
but convex for losses, for moderate probabilities. This is known as the “reflection 
effect”. It is in line with previous results from Schoemaker (1990) and is confirmed 
by various studies, including Abdellaoui (2000) with a parameter-free elicitation 
procedure, or Levin and Hart (2003) for children (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
find that 88% of subjects are risk-averse for gains and 87% of subjects risk seeking 
for losses (Baucells and Villasís 2010) have similar results: 72% of the subjects have 
preferences concave for gains and convex for losses (with 24% risk-averse for both 
gains and losses and 4% rather risk seeking). To the best of our knowledge no study 
has assessed whether shocks may affect differently preferences for gains and prefer-
ences for losses. This is a novelty of our analysis.
A second, and related, novelty is that we explicitly allow for preferences that fol-
low Prospect Theory. Although some of the papers examining the impact of shocks 
on preferences indicate that their findings are consistent with PT (Li et al. 2011a; 
Page et  al. 2014; Said et  al. 2015) most of them use EU models for eliciting risk 
preferences with lottery games. Yet since the works of Allais and Ellsberg in the 
1950s, psychologists and economists have provided substantial evidence that indi-
viduals do not necessarily behave according to the EU framework. One may argue 
that differences in decision-making observed after a natural disaster may not be 
imputed solely to a different curvature of the utility function but also to other modi-
fications of individual preferences such as distorted probability weighting. Our 
experimental design will allow us to assess these potential effects of natural disas-
ters on individual preferences using a non-expected utility framework.
3  Experimental design
3.1  Risk preference specification
As argued above, flood experience may have a different impact on risk preferences 
in these two domains. To address this possibility, we assume that respondents’s 
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preferences follow the (cumulative) PT framework (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
Under PT, individuals have sophisticated preferences that encompass reference 
dependence and probability weighting. Outcomes are considered as either gains or 
losses, with respect to a labile reference point, and individuals behave differently for 
gains and losses. Moreover, preferences are non-linear in probabilities, to account 
for the fact that individuals distort probabilities into decision weights.
In PT, risk behavior arises from the interplay of utility curvature, probability 
weighting, and reference dependence:
where  and  are parameters representing the curvature of the utility function, 
respectively, for the gain and the loss domains. The existing literature suggests 
that utility is concave for gains and convex for losses, and steeper for losses than 
for gains. Due to empirical considerations, we do not include a parameter of loss 
aversion.4
Under PT, the objective probabilities are distorted by a probability weighting 
function, (.).5 The probability weighting function is strictly increasing from the 
unit interval onto itself and satisfies (0) = 0 and (1) = 1 . Its specification has 
been widely discussed. We follow Gonzalez and Wu (1999) by assuming a linear 
relationship between logs, which yields:
where  is the parameter controlling the curvature of the probability weighting 
function.
Decision weights defined over the cumulative probability distributions were 





y𝛼 if y > 0
0 if y = 0
−(−y)𝛽 if y < 0,
(2)(p) ≡
p
p + (1 − p)
(3)
U(y1, p; y2) =
{
𝜔(p) ⋅ u(y1) + [1 − 𝜔(p)] ⋅ u(y2) if y1 ≥ y2 ≥ 0 or y1 ≤ y2 ≤ 0
𝜔(p) ⋅ u(y1) + 𝜔(1 − p) ⋅ u(y2) if y1 < 0 < y2.
4 In Tversky and Kahneman (1992), a loss aversion parameter is specified. The use of our simplified 
form has been dictated by empirical considerations. Our pilot experiment has indeed revealed that Viet-
namese households had some difficulties manipulating lotteries involving both gains and losses, which 
are required for identifying loss aversion. Bruhin et al. (2010) also use a similar sign-dependent power 
function arguing that it is the best compromise between parsimony and goodness of fit in the context of 
PT.
5 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) consider different probability weighting functions, one for the gain 
domain and the other for the loss domain. However, in most empirical applications they are the same 
(Abdellaoui et al. 2016).
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With the above functional forms, risk preferences are characterized by three 
parameters:  and  represent the curvature of the utility function in the gain and in 
the loss domains, respectively, and  reflects the curvature of the probability weight-
ing function.
EU is here a special case where  =  and  = 1 . Because our estimated param-
eters will differ from these, we find an overall support for CPT. Note that Tanaka 
et al. (2010) find that CPT describes their data better than EU on a sample of rural 
Vietnamese households, similar to our own sample. In addition, our specification 
implies Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) and Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA).6 These theoretical assumptions will indeed be met by our esti-
mates, as will be discussed.
3.2  Risk tasks
We use incentivized lottery tasks to measure the risk preferences of households, 
with an Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) procedure. Our approach is based on the 
experiment initially proposed in Eckel and Grossman (2002) (hereafter EG). The 
EG task has been used by, among others, Engle-Warnick et al. (2009), Dave et al. 
(2010), Castillo et al. (2010), Eckel et al. (2009) and Cameron and Shah (2015). The 
task is very similar to the famous one initially proposed by Binswanger (1980).
The EG task presents respondents with a limited set of gambles, lotteries with a 
50/50 chance of winning a low prize or a high prize; they are then asked to choose 
the lottery they prefer. The lotteries are designed to be increasing in expected payoff 
and risk (standard deviation). An important advantage of this design is that it is sim-
ple enough to be easily understood by subjects outside the usual convenient sample 
of university students. This is very important in our context since many of our par-
ticipants have received little or no education.
We extend the EG basic framework in several directions. First, we do not restrict 
individuals to play 50/50 chance lotteries: We use two additional tasks involving 
40/60 and 20/80 chance of winning a low or a high prize. By varying probabilities, 
we can assess if subjects use non-linear probability weights. Second, we introduce 
the possibility of making losses to elicit decisions both in the gain and in the loss 
domains. This is particularly important in our context since we expect households 
who have experienced a flood to have different risk-taking behaviors in these two 
domains. Lastly, we increase the number of lotteries in the gain domain from 5 to 9 
to measure risk preferences in a more precise way.7
Table  1 presents the five risk tasks completed by each individual. Tasks 1–3 
involve only gains whereas tasks 4 and 5 involve only losses. The expected pay-
offs and standard deviation of payoffs decrease with the lottery number, so that a 
7 Because we are primarily interested in the impact of flood experience on preferences, this asymmetry 
in the number of gambles should have a very limited impact on our analysis.
6 With our specification, the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficients for income y are (1 − )∕y in 
the gain domain and (1 − )∕y in the loss domain, and are thus decreasing in y. The relative risk aversion 
coefficients are equal to 1 −  and 1 −  and are thus constant.
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risk-averse individual should select a lottery in the bottom of each task. The least 
risky, or ‘safest’ lotteries are lotteries 8 and 9 for tasks 1–3, and lottery 5 for tasks 4 
and 5.
3.3  Risk preference elicitation
We use lottery choices to generate individual-specific intervals for each of the three 
parameters ( , ,  ) following the elicitation approach initially proposed by Tanaka 
et al. (2010) and more recently implemented by Liu (2013).8
In Table 1, each lottery in tasks 1–5 can be written as (XH,k,XL,k;pH,k) , where XH,k 
and XL,k are the high and the low payoffs in lottery k, and pH,k is the probability of the 




If lottery k is chosen, it means that it is preferred to lotteries k − 1 and k + 1 , which 
translates into a system of equations that allows us to identify the parameters. Note 
that, in all five tasks, for subjects preferring the first (respectively the last) lottery, 
one can only infer an upper (respectively a lower) bound on the parameter to be 
estimated.
Task 1 involves only gains and equiprobabilities ( pH,k = 0.5). Using the fact that 
(0.5) = 0.5 it is easy to show that individual decisions depend only on  , the curva-
ture of the utility function in the gain domain. If lottery k is chosen, it is preferred to 
lotteries k − 1 and k + 1 , which translates into:
This system of equations determines an interval [
k
, k] for each preferred lottery k. 
The same logic will be applied to the other parameters to be estimated.
Tasks 4 and 5 only involve losses and equiprobabilities ( pH,k = 0.5). Again, since 
(0.5) = 0.5 it is easy to show that individual decisions thus only depend on  , the 
curvature of the utility function in the loss domain. Applying the same logic as 
above to lottery k, k = 1,… , 5 , one obtains:
This system of equations determines an interval [
k
, k] for each preferred lottery k. 
















(6)− (−XH,k)𝛽 − (−XL,k)𝛽 > −(−XH,k−1)𝛽 − (−XL,k−1)𝛽
(7)− (−XH,k)𝛽 − (−XL,k)𝛽 > −(−XH,k+1)𝛽 − (−XL,k+1)𝛽 .
8 An alternative approach would have been to estimate the risk preference parameter using maximum 
likelihood, following the approach proposed by Harrison and Rutström (2008). As a robustness check, 
we have estimated the three parameters ( , ,  ) using this approach. Estimates are quite consistent with 
the individual-specific mid-point intervals obtained using the Tanaka et  al. (2010) approach, and are 
available from authors upon request.
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Table 1  Definition of risk tasks
This table describes the five experimental tasks used to elicit Prospect Theory preferences of households. 
All payoffs are expressed in Vietnamese Dongs (VND). The official exchange rate is 1 US$ for VND 
20,833 on April 2013
Task number Domain Lottery 
number
Payoff (high) Prob. (high) Payoff (low) Prob. (low)
1 Gain 1 94,200 0.5 3600 0.5
1 Gain 2 93,600 0.5 3800 0.5
1 Gain 3 90,000 0.5 6000 0.5
1 Gain 4 85,200 0.5 9000 0.5
1 Gain 5 81,000 0.5 10,800 0.5
1 Gain 6 73,200 0.5 13,200 0.5
1 Gain 7 66,500 0.5 15,000 0.5
1 Gain 8 63,000 0.5 15,600 0.5
1 Gain 9 59,400 0.5 16,200 0.5
2 Gain 1 87,500 0.6 10,000 0.4
2 Gain 2 82,500 0.6 15,000 0.4
2 Gain 3 77,500 0.6 20,000 0.4
2 Gain 4 74,000 0.6 23,000 0.4
2 Gain 5 71,000 0.6 25,000 0.4
2 Gain 6 67,500 0.6 27,500 0.4
2 Gain 7 64,000 0.6 30,000 0.4
2 Gain 8 61,000 0.6 32,000 0.4
2 Gain 9 58,000 0.6 34,000 0.4
3 Gain 1 60,000 0.8 7000 0.2
3 Gain 2 59,000 0.8 10,000 0.2
3 Gain 3 58,000 0.8 13,000 0.2
3 Gain 4 57,000 0.8 15,000 0.2
3 Gain 5 56,000 0.8 16,500 0.2
3 Gain 6 55,000 0.8 18,000 0.2
3 Gain 7 54,000 0.8 19,500 0.2
3 Gain 8 53,000 0.8 20,500 0.2
3 Gain 9 52,000 0.8 21,500 0.2
4 Loss 1 −  4000 0.5 −  84,800 0.5
4 Loss 2 −  8000 0.5 −  80,000 0.5
4 Loss 3 −  9600 0.5 −  76,000 0.5
4 Loss 4 −  10,400 0.5 −  72,000 0.5
4 Loss 5 −  11,200 0.5 −  68,800 0.5
5 Loss 1 −  12,500 0.5 −  50,000 0.5
5 Loss 2 −  16,000 0.5 −  45,000 0.5
5 Loss 3 −  19,000 0.5 −  40,000 0.5
5 Loss 4 −  20,500 0.5 −  37,500 0.5
5 Loss 5 −  22,000 0.5 −  35,000 0.5
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 can be inferred. Two intervals for the curvature of the utility function in the loss 
domain are elicited since we have two tasks and hence two observations per subject. 
This allows us to assess the stability of preferences across tasks.
Tasks  2 and 3 involve non-equiprobable lotteries in the gain domain. They 
allow us to identify a lower and an upper bound for the curvature of the prob-
ability weighting function (parameter  ), conditionally on the lottery choice in 
Task 1. Since:
it implies that:
If lottery k is the preferred one, it is preferred to lotteries k − 1 and k + 1 . It is 
straightforward to show that:
This system of equations determines an interval [
k
, k] depending on the preferred 
lottery k and conditionally on the preferred lottery in Task 1. Here, again, two inter-
vals for the curvature of the probability weighting function are elicited.
4  Data
4.1  Questionnaire development
After a pilot study in December 2011, the final survey (with face-to-face inter-
views) took place from April 4th to June 10th 2012, a period during which no 
flood or natural disaster was recorded in the Nghe An Province.
The survey is structured into seven sections, not all of which are used in this 
article. The survey also includes two choice experiments used to assess how 
Vietnamese households value a reduction in flood risks, and a flood insurance 
contract (Reynaud et al. 2013; Reynaud and Nguyen 2016; Reynaud et al. 2018). 
Here, we use:
 (i) socio-demographic questions on household’s income, housing characteristics 
and family structure,
 (ii) questions on the respondent’s experience with flooding, flood damage and 
evacuation due to flood threats,
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 (iii) and lottery games with monetary incentives, to elicit risk preferences, using 
the five lottery tasks described above (see Supplementary Material 1).
4.2  Sample
4.2.1  Sampling strategy
First, 14 districts (out of 17 in the Nghe An Province) were selected based on geo-
graphical location (coastal area, plain area, mountain area). Following discussions 
with local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
two representative villages/communes were targeted within each district (there are 
417 villages/communes in the Nghe an Province). Finally, within each village/com-
mune 16 households were randomly selected from the village/commune listing of 
registered citizens. Our sample is thus made of 448 households observed in 28 vil-
lages/communes from 14 districts in the Nghe An Province.
4.2.2  Socio‑demographic characteristics in the sample
The head of the household is 49.8-year old on average. Average household size is 
just above 4 and 16.7% of households have at least one child younger than three. The 
average household income in 2011 was VND 32.5 million per year (US$1560)—
which is lower than the average for the Nghe An Province in 2010 (VND 48 million, 
or US$2300). Farming (or fishing) is the main occupation for 79.2% of household 
heads. Employees represent 5.6% of our sample and retired households, 5.1%. Last, 
30.6% of household heads have attended at least high school.
4.3  Instructions and incentives for the risk tasks
An important concern in risk preferences elicitation through lottery games is the 
extent to which subjects understand the instructions. Even though we selected simple 
tasks, the experiment could be complex to understand, especially with field subjects 
in a poor region. As many of our participants have received little or no education, we 
have provided all experimenters with clear and visual instructions to make it easier for 
illiterate subjects to understand the consequences of any decisions they made in the 
games. Moreover, before starting the risk tasks, we tested comprehension by asking 
test questions. Instructions for the experimental tasks are available in the Supplemen-
tary Material 1. To illustrate the chances of winning/losing money, we used ten balls 
numbered from 1 to 10. These balls were put into a bag, and subsequently stirred.
The lottery games are incentivized, allowing respondents to earn real money based 
on their answers. A respondent’s payoff is determined in the following way: Each 
respondent was given a show-up fee of VND 85 000 (US$4.08), ensuring a strictly 
positive payoff even in case of losses in the lottery games. We randomly selected one 
of the five risk tasks to be implemented with real money: Five numbered balls were 
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put into a bag and a random draw of a ball determined the task to be implemented. 
Then, ten balls were put into the bag and the preferred lottery of the household was 
played. The average gain obtained by respondents in the lottery game was VND 37 
800 (US$1.8) and it varied from VND -84 800 (US$-4.1) to VND 94 200 (US$4.5) in 
our sample. Including the show-up fee the average monetary gain was VND 122 800 
(US$5.9) which represents 4.5% of the average monthly household income. Out of the 
448 households interviewed, 370 households completed the risk tasks. This subsample 
is not significantly different from the global sample in terms of socioeconomic char-
acteristics (including age, income or family size) nor of household flood experience.
4.4  Measuring household flooding experience
We demonstrate that the cost of flooding is significant in our sample, which supports 
our view that floods are catastrophic events.
The Nghe An Province is exposed to flooding. Table 2 presents data about house-
holds’ past experience with floods. To address the multi-dimensional nature of 
flooding experience (occurence, trauma, health...), three variables are used: flood-
ing, evacuation and injuries. In our sample, 41.3% of households report that their 
house has been flooded at least once in the past 5 years (among them, 76.5% have 
been flooded for the last time in 2011); 21.4% of respondents have been evacuated 
from their home due to a flood, at least once in the past 5 years (which can be con-
sidered as a traumatic event); and 5.1% had a member of the household injured due 
to a flood at least once in the past 5 years. These percentages are in line with the 
information on flooding risk in the Nghe An Province we collected from Vietnamese 
public authorities.
Table 2  Household flood history and cost of flooding in the last 5 years
SD is the standard deviation. Statistics reported in Panel B have been computed on a sample of 370 
households
Variable Mean SD
Panel A: household flood history in the last 5 years
 House flooded at least once (0,1) 0.413 0.493
 Respondent evacuated at least once (0,1) 0.214 0.410
 One household member injured at least once (0,1) 0.051 0.221
Panel B: cost of flooding (annual mean based on the last 5 years)
 Flooding has represented a significant cost (0,1) 0.759 0.428
 House cost (VND million) 2.345 5.428
 Agricultural cost (VND million ) 3.000 5.873
 Health cost (VND million) 0.263 1.405
 Total cost (VND million) 5.610 8.859
 House cost (% of income) 8.624 20.153
 Agricultural cost (% of income) 13.882 25.003
 Health cost (% of income) 1.293 7.965
 Total cost (% of income) 23.800 34.354
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Concerning the cost of flooding, 75.9% of households consider that flooding has 
represented a significant expenditure over the previous 5 years. To assess the actual 
cost of flooding, we asked respondents to provide an estimate of the average annual 
cost of flooding for their household in the previous 5 years, distinguishing damage 
to their house and house contents, damage to agricultural production and damage to 
health (all medical expenses due to flooding for any member of the household). The 
cost of flooding is reported in Table 2. If we combine agricultural, house and health 
damage, the average annual cost of flood is VND 5.6 million per year, or 23.80% of 
the average annual household income.
The flood expenses reported by households could be overestimated or underesti-
mated for strategic or psychological reasons, or simply because this data is not easily 
available. In the remainder of the paper, we mainly assess flood experience through 
the three variables mentioned above: house flooded, being evacuated, or injured due 
to a flood. We believe that these variables better measure the severity of the flood 
as perceived by the household than monetary self-reported estimates. That being 
said, the reported values are consistent with objective flooding risk in the Nghe An 
Province.
5  Individual risk preferences and flood experience
This section first provides evidence that flood exposure is random, by showing 
that our sample is balanced on retrospective variables and on fixed variables which 
should not be altered by flood exposure. We then present evidence of changes in risk 
preferences induced by a flood experience.
5.1  Identification strategy
Following Cameron and Shah (2015), our empirical strategy consists in regressing 
our risk attitude measures on the household flood experience measures, while con-
trolling for household and geographic characteristics fixed effects. Similar identify-
ing assumptions have been used by Page et al. (2014) for flood risks and by Callen 
(2015) and Cassar et al. (2017) for Tsunami risks.
A concern is that if people affected by a flood are different, on relevant charac-
teristics, from those who have not been affected, this approach will suffer from a 
selection bias (Cameron and Shah 2015). More specifically, more risk-averse house-
holds may decide to live in an area where the likelihood of being flooded is lower. 
They may also be more likely to relocate to a safer area after having experienced a 
first traumatic flood. We could, therefore, observe a correlation between risk pref-
erences and being affected by a flood. If wealthier households live in areas with a 
low flood risk and if risk preferences are related to income, we could also observe a 
positive correlation between flood experience and risk aversion that does not reflect 
causality.
While it is not possible to fully rule out this possibility, the characteristics of 
Vietnam make it less likely that flood experience and migration be strongly linked: 
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First, most empirical studies suggest that internal migration in Vietnam is primarily 
influenced by the cost of moving, expected income differentials, disparities in the 
quality of public services, and demographic differences in characteristics between 
source and destination areas (Nguyen-Hoang and McPeak 2010). Second, although 
the Constitution of Vietnam guarantees freedom of movement and residence, the 
Household Registration System (ho khau) still creates barriers to migrations, for 
instance by limiting access to essential services (Dang Nguyen 2009).
To address the issue of flood-induced migration, we compare individual or house-
hold characteristics according to their flood experience using two-sample t tests (see 
Table 3). There is a huge empirical literature which has investigated how risk pref-
erences vary across some observable characteristics of households. The interested 
reader may refer to Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) for studies correlating risk 
preferences and gender of respondents. Dohmen et  al. (2011) provides an assess-
ment of the role of education on individual risk preferences. For income, the general 
consensus is that wealthier households are more likely to have a risk-seeking profile 
(Hopland et  al. 2016). Here, income, gender, education, household size and pres-
ence of a child under 3 years, which are among the strongest and most consistent 
predictors of risk preferences across studies, appear not to statistically differ across 
samples whatever the flooding experience considered (being flooded, evacuated and 
injured). Households who experienced a flood in the past five years are thus not dif-
ferent from those who did not, with respect to the main variable of interest. We can 
compare the risk preferences of affected and non-affected households to determine 
the causal effect of experiencing a flood on risk preferences.
5.2  Preferred lotteries and flooding experience
Table  4 documents the percentage of respondents per preferred lottery, for each 
task. Results are presented for all households, for households whose house has been 
flooded at least once in the past 5 years, for households evacuated at least once in 
the past 5 years and for households injured at least once in the past 5 years. We also 
report results according to flooding intensity in the past 5 years, separating house-
holds reporting water elevation in their house greater than 100 cm at least once, and 
households who have been flooded more than 8 days per year.
Table  4 calls for a few comments. First, the distributions of preferred lotteries 
appear to often be bimodal with a particularly high proportion of respondents choos-
ing one of the extreme lotteries. For the ‘gain’ tasks (tasks 1–3), between 70 and 
80% of respondents choose an interior lottery (lotteries 2–8). Depending on the task, 
between 15.7 and 20.8% of respondents prefer the riskiest lottery (lottery 1) whereas 
between 3.0 and 11.4% prefer the safest one (lottery 9). This indicates a high hetero-
geneity of risk preferences in the gain domain which can also be observed in the loss 
domain (tasks 4 and 5).
Flood experience appears to have a significant impact on the preferred lottery, 
both in the gain and in the loss domains. For instance in task 1 (gain domain), 24.1% 
of households having experienced at least one house flooding over the last five years 
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Table 4  Distribution of subjects per preferred lottery in the five risk tasks (in %)
N is the sample size. All households corresponds to the full sample. Households with house flooded, 
Households evacuated and Households injured respectively correspond to households whose house has 
been flooded at least once in the last 5 years, to households who have been evacuated at least once from 
their home in the last 5 years and to households who have suffered from at least one injury in the last 
5 years. Flood elevation ≥ 100 cm is the subsample of households reporting a water elevation in their 
house greater than 100 cm at least once in the last 5 years and Flood duration ≥ 8 days corresponds to 
households reporting that their house has been flooded more than 8 days per year on average in the last 
5 years. All figures are percentages. For instance, in Task 1, 20.8% of the respondents (370 households) 
declare to prefer lottery 1. If we restrict the sample to households reporting that their house has been 
flooded at least once in the last 5 years (153 households), this percentage increases slightly to 21.6%
N Lottery number
Most risky Least risky
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Task 1 (gain)
 All households 370 20.8 11.6 13.5 10.0 12.7 7.3 8.7 5.7 9.7
 Households with house flooded 153 21.6 9.2 13.1 7.8 13.7 7.8 7.8 5.9 13.1
 Households evacuated 79 24.1 8.9 12.7 11.4 10.1 7.6 7.6 5.1 12.7
 Households injured 19 42.1 10.5 10.5 5.3 0.0 10.5 5.3 5.3 10.5
 Flood elevation ≥ 100 cm 33 18.2 6.1 6.1 12.1 18.2 12.1 3.0 9.1 15.2
 Flood duration ≥ 8 days 65 23.1 9.2 16.9 6.2 9.2 7.7 7.7 3.1 16.9
Task 2 (gain)
 All households 370 15.7 24.9 16.0 7.6 4.9 6.0 8.9 4.9 11.4
 Households with house flooded 153 17.7 19.6 13.7 7.8 5.2 6.5 9.2 5.2 15.0
 Households evacuated 79 15.2 21.5 15.2 7.6 5.1 6.3 7.6 5.1 16.5
 Households injured 19 21.1 26.3 15.8 10.5 10.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 0.0
 Flood elevation ≥ 100 cm 33 21.2 9.1 12.1 9.1 3.0 3.0 12.1 6.1 24.2
 Flood duration ≥ 8 days 65 18.5 21.5 18.5 6.2 6.2 4.6 1.5 6.2 16.9
Task 3 (gain)
 All households 370 18.7 14.1 14.6 14.3 13.8 9.7 3.8 8.1 3.0
 Households with house flooded 153 17.7 12.4 15.7 12.4 15.0 8.5 3.3 11.1 3.9
 Households evacuated 79 15.2 11.4 15.2 17.7 15.2 7.6 3.8 12.7 1.3
 Households injured 19 15.8 15.8 10.5 15.8 21.1 10.5 0.0 0.0 10.5
 Flood elevation ≥ 100 cm 33 15.2 6.1 12.1 15.2 18.2 9.1 6.1 15.2 3.0
 Flood duration ≥ 8 days 65 15.4 10.8 13.9 12.3 20.0 4.6 6.2 12.3 4.6
Task 4 (loss)
 All households 370 15.1 17.8 21.1 23.8 22.2
 Households with house flooded 153 14.4 16.3 19.0 22.2 28.1
 Households evacuated 79 11.4 13.9 19.0 26.6 29.1
 Households injured 19 5.3 31.6 10.5 31.6 21.1
 Flood elevation ≥ 100 cm 33 15.2 9.1 21.2 39.4 15.2
 Flood duration ≥ 8 days 65 15.1 17.8 21.1 23.8 22.2
Task 5 (loss)
 All households 370 11.9 22.4 24.1 16.2 25.4
 Households with house flooded 153 11.8 17.7 26.8 12.4 31.4
 Households evacuated 79 6.3 13.9 25.3 16.5 38.0
 Households injured 19 0.0 10.5 36.8 10.5 42.1
 Flood elevation ≥ 100 cm 33 15.2 15.2 18.2 21.2 30.3
 Flood duration ≥ 8 days 65 12.3 12.3 30.8 15.4 29.2
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and 42.1% of households who have been evacuated at least once in the last the last 
five years prefer the riskiest lottery (lottery 1) in comparaison to 20.8% for the full 
sample. In the loss domain (task  4 and task  5), households having experienced a 
flood, are on contrary more likely to prefer the safest lottery (lottery 5). This is espe-
cially true is task 5 where the proportion of household who prefer the safest lottery 
varies from 30.3% for household reporting that their house has been flooded more 
than 8 days per year on average in the last 5 years to 42.1% to households who have 
suffered from at least one injury in the last 5 years, whereas the percentage is only 
25.4% on the full sample.
Table 5 presents the results of discrete choice models where the dependent vari-
able is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual selects one of the two least 
risky, ‘safest’, lotteries (lotteries 8 and 9) in the tasks with gains, or the least risky 
lottery (lottery 5) in the tasks with losses.9 Each subject participated in five tasks. 
We, therefore, use panel estimation with unobserved individual effects that are mod-
eled using a random-effects specification. Errors are clustered at the village level to 
account for possible intra-group correlation. Models (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) corre-
spond to different ways of measuring flood experience (respectively being flooded, 
evacuated, injured, more than 1 meter inside one’s house, and a house flooded more 
than 8 days per year).
Our explanatory variables include socioeconomic characteristics of the household 
(age, gender, income, education), a dummy variable for tasks in the loss domain, a 
variable measuring a household’s expectation about future flood damage and a vari-
able measuring household participation to social and informal networks.
Respondents were asked to rank the flood damage they expect for their house-
hold in the next 10 years, on a scale going from 1 (no losses and no damage) to 10 
(critical damage and losses). We argue that this variable provides a valid measure 
of personal flood risk perception, which is known to be an important determinant of 
decision-making under risk (Gollier and Pratt 1996; Quiggin 2003).
Informal and social networks play an important risk-sharing role in many develop-
ing countries and help households smooth their consumption despite potentially 
large income shocks. In a seminal paper, Townsend (1994) shows that community-
based informal insurance arrangements are very effective at smoothing poor Indian 
farmers’ consumption over idiosyncratic income shocks. We thus include these net-
works as a potential determinant of decision-making under risk. Measuring social 
network participation at the household level is challenging, however, due to a high 
level of heterogeneity. We use as a proxy the number of institutions/organisations 
each household belongs to. Each respondent selected the organizations to whom he 
belonged within a list of twenty (including the Communist Party, religious groups, 
labor unions, professional associations, veteran associations) to which he could add 
a name if needed. The intensity of social connections is captured by the number of 
institutions/organisations each household belongs to (on average 2.7). While 14.51% 
9 As a robustness test we have also considered a dummy variable equal to 1 only if an individual selects 
the safest lottery in the gain domain. Econometric results are consistent with the ones reported in Table 5.
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of households don’t belong to any organization, 15.85% report a high level of social 
interactions (at least 5 different organizations).
Several results from Table 5 deserve attention.
(i) Flood experience is a strong predictor of choosing the safest lotteries. All coef-
ficients of variables measuring flood experience are positive. Being flooded is 
significant at 1%, being evacuated at 5%. The intensity of flooding also matters 
since the likelihood of choosing the safest lotteries increases with the average 
duration of floods at 1% (flood elevation is close to being significant at 10%, 
but is not). These preliminary results suggest that behaviors in lottery tasks are 
affected by individual flood experience.
(ii) Interestingly, households exhibit significantly different behavior in the loss and 
gain domains. We find that households are much more likely to select the saf-
est lotteries in the loss domain than in the gain domain. The coefficient for the 
dummy variable used to identify the loss domain is positive and significant at 1% 
for all the models considered. This result confirms the need to consider different 
parameters in these two domains.
(iii) Our measure of expectations about future flood damage has a significant and 
negative coefficient: Respondents who expect a high future flood damage have a 
lower likelihood of selecting the safest lotteries. An interesting interpretation is 
that expectations may measure perceptions of a background risk. A background 
risk is an exogeneous risk that is uncorrelated with the main risk considered—
in our case the lotteries (Eeckhoudt et al. 1996). Within an EU framework and 
under some assumptions, Gollier and Pratt (1996) have shown that an increase 
in background risk leads to more risk aversion, in contradiction with our finding. 
Conversely, for non-expected utility behaviors, Quiggin (2003) shows that with 
probability weighting, adding more background risk can actually increase the 
propensity of a decision-maker to select riskier choices—as in our sample. And 
for PT preferences, Beaud and Willinger (2015) show that a higher background 
risk can lead either to more or less risk-taking.
(iv) Household income is highly significant in all the models considered. Respondents 
with a high income are less likely to select the safest lotteries, so (absolute) risk 
aversion seems to be decreasing in wealth—as for farmers in China (Liu 2013) 
or Ethiopia (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009); This is in line with our assumption of 
DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) preferences, that is implied by the use 
of a power function.10 The type of professional occupation also matters. Strong 
dependance on agricultural activities is associated with riskier choices—possibly 
due to self-selection into a riskier activity, or increasing risk tolerance due to 
contextual effects. Conversely, the individual characteristics of the respondent 
(age, gender, education) appear not to be significant. For comparison, Tanaka 
et al. (2010) report that gender (as here), ethnicity and income (contrary to here) 
10 Recall that with our specification the coefficient of absolute risk aversion are (1 − )∕y in the gain 
domain and (1 − )∕y in the loss domain. They should thus be decreasing in income y, which is what we 
observe in our estimates.
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were non-significant in explaining risk preferences for a sample of Vietnamese 
households.
(v) Households with a large social network are also more likely to select the saf-
est lotteries. Informal networks play an important risk diversification role in 
developing countries. Belonging to large networks provides insurance so that we 
would expect it to be associated to more risk taking. However, two other effects 
can explain why belonging to large networks and taking less risk correlates. First, 
households who wish to belong to several networks may be more risk-averse 
than others: They are willing to bear the costs of developing informal networks 
to get additional insurance, and they are likely to search for diversification in 
their social connections. Both elements indicate that they are probably more 
risk-averse. Second, individuals who are more risk-averse than others may find 
it easier to belong to large social networks: They can be viewed as ‘safer’ and 
more attractive connections, making it easier for them to match with others.
5.3  Interval regressions of individual preference parameters
Let us now consider some explanatory models for the three parameters (  ,  and  ) 
that describe risk preferences according to our PT specification. The dependent vari-
ables are the intervals for  ,  and  that subjects implicitly choose when they select 
their preferred lotteries in the five risk tasks. All models are thus estimated using 
regressions with interval censoring (interval regression). Errors are clustered at the 
village level to account for possible intra-group correlation.11
Table  6 first presents estimates assuming homogenous risk preferences across 
individuals. In the second part of this table we introduce different measures of flood 
experience while, in the last part, we control for individual characteristics.
In the homogenous preference model presented in panel A, the coefficients for the 
curvature of the utility function are positive and significant in both the gain and the 
loss domains: the utility function is concave for gains and convex for losses, with a 
S-shape function, in line with the so-called reflection effect observed in the litera-
ture. Curvature coefficients are lower than one, reflecting a diminishing sensitivity to 
changes away from the reference point, taken to be zero. Last, the probability func-
tion exhibits the usual inverse-S shape, with a coefficient larger than one.
More importantly, we find that Vietnamese households appear to have domain-
specific risk preferences. Indeed, the coefficient measuring utility curvature in the 
gain domain is significantly greater than the one for the loss domain (p < 0.0001): A 
given payoff change will result in a greater utility change in the gain domain than in 
the loss domain.
This is in contrast to estimates obtained with power functions in the literature for 
richer countries (and absent shocks): The latter tend to be slightly larger in the loss 
domain, but relatively similar (Booij et al. 2010). Compared to this literature, one 
11 Interval regressions have also been estimated by including district-level fixed effects to account for 
regional heterogeneity. Results concerning the relationship between flood experience and risk prefer-
ences are qualitatively very similar to the ones presented in Table 6.
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can also note that the curvature coefficients are smaller (i.e., farther away from lin-
earity) in our Vietnamese sample.
Domain-specific risk preferences imply that Vietnamese households may adopt 
different behaviors in the gain and in the loss domains. Those different behaviors 
would have not been captured by an EU model with a single risk aversion parameter. 
In what follows, we analyze whether flood experience has a uniform impact on risk 
preferences in both domains or, to the contrary, a differentiated impact.
The third column of panel A provides some evidence of probability distortions. 
Coefficient  is significantly different from one (p < 0.0001): respondents do not use 
linear probability weighting in risk tasks. The probability weight estimates is 1.15: 
respondents underestimate low probabilities and overestimates high probabilities. 
This S-shape of the probability weighting function is unusual in richer countries. 
However, Tanaka et  al. (2010) and Liu (2013) obtain a similar pattern on a sam-
ple of Vietnamese households and Chinese farmers respectively. This result suggests 
policy implications: Launching education campaigns to raise public awareness about 
floods and their frequency may be effective in fostering preparation and prevention 
in Vietnam. Using taxes and subsidies may not be as effective, because the distor-
tions in probabilities will affect decisions.
Panel B relates to the heterogeneous risk preference model in which the three 
parameters  ,  and  , are only impacted by flood experience.
 (i) First, flood experience significantly shapes the utility function in the loss 
domain. Being flooded, being evacuated and a duration longer than 8 days are 
all significant, at 5, 1 and 10% respectively. These types of flood experience 
are associated with more risk aversion (the estimated coefficients of these three 
variables are negative).
 (ii) Second, no significant impact is found in the gain domain, except for water 
elevation.
 (iii) Third, we find no impact of flood experience on probability weighting. Viet-
namese households underestimate low probabilities and overestimate high 
probabilities, but these distortions are unrelated to flood experience.
The estimates of the heterogeneous risk preference model controlling for indi-
vidual characteristics, are consistent with the findings above. Risk preferences in the 
gain domain are almost not affected by flood experience. Only households reporting 
a maximal water elevation in their house greater than 100 cm at least once in the last 
5 years appear to be more risk-averse in the gain domain. Risk preferences in the 
loss domain are much more impacted since being flooded or evacuated, or flooded 
for at least 8 days per year on average are significant. Flooded households tend to be 
more risk-averse in the loss domain. Only a few characteristics of respondents are 
significant for explaining utility curvature. Older respondents appear to be less risk-
averse in the gain domain—an unusual result in richer countries (von Gaudecker 
et  al. 2011; Dohmen et  al. 2012)—but no significant impact is found in the loss 
domain. Households engaged in agricultural activities—that are inherently risky— 
are also less risk-averse; as mentioned, this is possibly due to habituation or to self-
selection into those activities. It should be noted that income has a null coefficient 
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(which is significant in the loss domain). This indicates that the curvature of the 
utility function both in the gain and loss domains is constant with respect to wealth. 
Our estimated preferences thus exhibit CRRA (as assumed in our specification of 
preferences). Lastly, probability weighting is not affected by any of the respondent’s 
characteristics, which suggests highly homogenous preferences with respect to this 
parameter.
6  Complementary analyses and robustness
6.1  Income and wealth effects
Instead of representing preference changes, the behavioral differences we observe 
might be driven by the changes in income that accompany natural disasters: house-
holds may become more risk-averse after a flood simply because their relative 
wealth decreases. This explanation has been previously mentioned in the context of 
floods. For example, Cameron and Shah (2015) show that one part of the higher lev-
els of risk aversion for individuals that suffered a flood or earthquake in Indonesia 
can be attributed to the effect of the incurred loss in income (under the assumption 
of a decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function).
Addressing empirically this issue is difficult in our context since we do not have 
in our data income or wealth before and after flood occurrence. However, our sur-
vey asked if floods have represented significant expenditures for their household 
over the previous 5 years. This question allows us to make a distinction between 
two categories of households impacted by a flood: those who have experienced sig-
nificant income losses, and those who have not. As a robustness check, we have re-
estimated our models by interacting the flood experience variables (“being flooded” 
and “being evacuated”) with dummy variables for individual reporting significant 
or insignificant expenditures due to flooding.12 Empirical results are presented in 
Table  7. Estimations must be interpreted with respect to the reference category 
(households not flooded in the last 5 years).
Results: Table 7 allows checking if bearing significant expenditures after a flood 
has an impact on parameters  ,  and  . The bottom of the table reports the result 
of the hypothesis test: “Flood experience × No significant expenditures”= “Flood 
experience × Significant expenditures”. In all cases except one the hypothesis of 
equal coefficients is not rejected. The observed changes in risk preferences in our 
data do not seem driven by wealth or income shocks after a flood.
12 The three other flood experiences (being injured, water elevation in house greater than 100 cm and 
being flooded more than 8 days per year) cannot be included due to high collinearity with reporting sig-
nificant expenditures.
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6.2  Background risk
The risk of a flood is only partly insurable at best, and can be considered exogenous 
at the time the subjects make decisions on the monetary lotteries. Flood risk, there-
fore, constitutes a “background risk” in the sense of Eeckhoudt et al. (1996): Flood 
risks are indeed risks “that are not under the control of the agent, and that are inde-
pendent of endogenous risks”, where the endogenous risks are the lotteries. A pos-
sible explanation for a change in financial risk taking after experiencing a flood is 
that this experience could change the respondents’ perception about the background 
risk (a flood in the future). Such learning or updating could explain changes in risk 
attitudes even if risk preferences are actually not altered.
A household’s expectation about future flood damage can be considered as 
a proxy for beliefs about the background risk. Our results, therefore, show that 
respondents who expect a high future flood damage (high background risk) are less 
likely to select the safest lotteries.
We consider below an alternative measure of the background risk. Cameron and 
Shah (2015) use the village mean number of earthquakes and floods as a proxy for 
background risk. Following them, we re-estimate our models, replacing the indi-
vidual flood experience measures by village-level averages. Village-level mean 
flood exposure provides an alternative measure of background risk. We posit that 
the occurrence of a flood in the village induces a change in the perception of the 
background risk, and use mean exposure (an objective measure) as a proxy for 
this (subjective) perception. Aside from testing for robustness, there are two main 
reasons justifying to replace individual flood experience variables by village-level 
averages. First, reported individual flood experience measures may be strategically 
altered if respondents believed that the survey could be used by policy-makers. Sec-
ond, the risk behavior of an individual who has not been directly affected by a flood 
in the past 5 years could still be modified if a large proportion of his neighbors has 
been affected. Interestingly, witnessing the effects of a flood on neighbors is likely 
to bring a similar informative content but a lower emotional upheaval than direct 
personal experience.
Flood risk perception is influenced by early disaster experiences, but other fac-
tors including socio-demographic characteristics, knowledge about hazards, institu-
tion trust, or feelings and emotions also play an important role (Bubeck et al. 2012). 
For this reason, we believe that background risk perception cannot be fully assessed 
through past disaster experience, and that our measure of subjective expectations 
about future flood damage is more relevant. Subjective expectation better incorpo-
rates these other factors, which is why we have favored it in the previous sections.
Results: We find that the village-level measure of background risk has an impact 
neither on the curvature of the utility function in the gain domain, nor on the prob-
ability weighting parameter, see Table 8.13
13 In Table 8, flood experience is measured by the fact that a household has been flooded at least once in 
the last 5 years. Results for being evacuated or injured are available from the authors upon request.
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We find, however, a significant and negative impact on the curvature of the util-
ity function in the loss domain: a higher village-level background risk negatively 
impacts the curvature of the utility function in the loss domain (the estimate, -0.29, 
is significant at the 1% level). It has no significant impact in the gain domain nor on 
probability weighting. This result strongly differs from the one we obtain with our 
individual, expectations-based measure. A possible explanation is that the village-
level variable does not involve the same emotional impact as personal experience, 
and may not change beliefs in the same way. The village measure would thus imper-
fectly correlate with the change in risk perception. None of the variables which were 
significant with the individual measure of background risk is impacted by the inclu-
sion of the village-level measure.
6.3  Time preferences
A potential concern is that we do not control for time preferences, whereas risk 
and time preferences might be correlated within individuals (Andersen et al. 2008). 
Because what an individual discounts is his utility from monetary amounts, and not 
the monetary amounts themselves, estimating risk aversion (to get the curvature 
of the utility function) is needed to precisely estimate discount rates. The discount 
rates can otherwise be overestimated. If they are indeed correlated, our risk aversion 
results could be biased due to the omission of individual time preferences (Cameron 
and Shah 2015). We thus include in the regressions individual discount factors elic-
ited through hypothetical questions using a double referendum format (Supplemen-
tary Material 2).
Results: The discount factor is never significant in the regressions, see Table 8. 
Moreover, our main results about risk aversion are unchanged. The omission of time 
preferences therefore appears unproblematic.
6.4  Temporary versus permanent change in preferences
The persistence of the impact of natural disasters on risk preferences is not well 
known. Eckel et al. (2009) report that changes in risk preferences appear to attenuate 
within one year. Conversely Cameron and Shah (2015) and Callen (2015) document 
effects, respectively, up to two and a half years, and 9 years after exposure. Cassar 
et  al. (2017) report that preferences in Thailand are significantly different for the 
respondents who lived in areas hit the hardest by the 2004 tsunami, four and a half 
years later.
Our data includes the month and year of the last occurence for each type of flood 
experience (being flooded, evacuated or injured). This provides measures of the time 
lag since the flood event. The average time lags are very similar for the three flood 
experience: a year and a month for being injured, a year and two months for being 
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flooded or evacuated. We, therefore, retained only the time lag for being flooded in 
our estimates. Since the Nghe An Province has been affected by particularly strong 
flood episodes in 2011, the time lag is smaller than 12 months for 76.8% of flooded 
households; 8.6% of flooded households report, however, a time lag greater than 24 
months.
Results: Table 8 shows that the time lag is never significant in our estimated mod-
els. This suggests that the shift in risk preferences after a flood persists over time, 
without significant attenuation over the relevant time period.
6.5  Aid received by households after a disaster
Some households having experienced a flood may have received some form of aid 
(either formal or informal) whereas other may not. This may create a problem for 
two reasons. Receiving aid might create an income effect which is not necessarily 
included into income data reported by respondents. Receiving aid may also alter 
individual preferences for risk, as it does for trust and generosity. Receiving aid 
indeed makes people more trusting in the long run (Andrabi and Das 2010; Cam-
eron and Shah 2015) and increases generosity, but only for the most affected indi-
viduals, after a tsunami in Sri Lanka (Becchetti et al. 2017).
To address these issues, we asked each household if he received any form of aid 
(financial or material) after having experienced a flood. Aid from local authorities is 
reported by 62.97% of households. Respectively 47.02% and 48.35% report aid from 
national authorities and from social networks (family, friends, neighbors, commu-
nity associations and NGOs). Vietnamese local authorities are indeed in charge of 
relief distribution to flood victims.
Results: We find that receiving aid from local authorities or from social networks 
has a significant impact on risk preferences. Households having received aid from 
social networks appear to be more risk-averse in the gain domain. This may be 
because receiving aid from social networks implies reciprocity, including sharing 
large future windfalls, which makes more average gains more attractive. Risk aver-
sion also increases for aid received from local authorities, but in the loss domain.14
We also find that receiving aid after a flood significantly shapes probability 
weighting. Interestingly, the impact depends upon the aid provider. Households 
who received aid from local authorities distort probabilities in a very limited way, 
whereas the S-shape of the probability weighting function is exacerbated for house-
holds benefitting from aid from social networks. This impact may have to do with 
the perception of households about their ability to face adverse events. Besides, 
aid from local authorities and from social networks differ in two important dimen-
sions: First, local authorities intervene in case of a flood but not in case of private 
adverse events, contrary to social networks; Second, aid from local authorities does 
not impose significant costs, contrary to aid from social networks. The latter entails 
14 A tentative explanation is that formal aid tends to consists in fixed transfers (at least in a given range 
of flood severity) so that it covers well average losses but is not responsive to very large losses. This 
aspect of formal aid would be more salient to those households who experienced it.
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reciprocity, reimbursement and providing for less favored members when one bene-
fits from ‘good times’, as mentioned above. Social networks thus insure households, 
by attenuating both large losses and large gains, under reciprocal solidarity. This 
insurance property may make exceptional events less important. This would corre-
spond to the exacerbated S-shape that we observe for probability weighting.
7  Conclusion
7.1  Academic implications
We have shown that the preferences of respondents are best described by PT (rather 
than EU) and are in line with the assumptions of DARA and CRRA. Importantly 
for our object of study, experience with being flooded or evacuated significantly 
increases risk aversion in the loss domain. Flood experience has, however, no signifi-
cant impact in the gain domain. This differential impact in the loss and gain domains 
may help explain why some works report a significant impact of natural disasters on 
risk preferences (Eckel et al. 2009; Andrabi and Das 2010; Li et al. 2011a; Cameron 
and Shah 2015; Cassar et al. 2017) while others do not (Voors et al. 2012; Callen 
2015; Said et al. 2015). Because other studies do not distinguish estimates between 
gains and losses, they measure overall effects, and the number of tasks with gains or 
with losses varies across studies. This may explain the variance in results.
We also contribute to the empirical literature which assesses the impact of back-
ground risk perception on risk-taking behaviors. Our empirical analysis reveals that 
results drastically differ depending on the measure used for background risk. With 
the measure based on individual subjective expectations about future impacts of 
flood, a higher background risk is associated with more risk taking. We obtain an 
opposite result with a measure based on local (village) experience, a result in line 
with the risk vulnerability conjecture. Importantly, for both measures of background 
risk, flood experience retains its significance. This indicates that the impact of flood 
on preferences goes beyond a change in background risk perception.
Both results mentioned above suggest a possible role of emotions. Flooding is a 
highly emotional event. One possible explanation for the difference in the gain and 
loss domains is that emotions are more intensely triggered, and more durable, for 
losses than for gains (Levin et al. 2012; De Martino et al. 2010; Shin et al. 2006; 
Scott et al. 2015). The difference in the impact of personal subjective expectations 
and local, more objective, information could also arise from the stronger emotions 
triggered by personal experience than by external observation. Future research 
would be needed to confirm whether more intense emotional involvement is associ-
ated to stronger impacts on preferences.
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7.2  Implications for policy and forecasting
We find no impact of flood experience on probability weighting. Vietnamese house-
holds underestimate low probabilities and overestimate high probabilities, but inter-
estingly, these distortions are unrelated to flood experience: Distortions do not seem 
to respond to learning from experience. Education and informational campaigns 
about flood risks could be quite valuable ways of fostering prevention despite behav-
ioral biases in probability weighting. Other instruments that target only financial 
valuation (such as subsidies) may be less cost-effective, given these biases, even if 
they may present other benefits.
Our results also highlight that receiving aid makes individuals more risk-taking. 
Receiving aid also impacts the way individuals assess probabilities, but in a very 
different way depending on the source of aid: aid from local authorities limits prob-
ability distortions while aid from social networks, perhaps due to expected recipro-
cal contributions in good times, amplifies the S-shape of the probability weighting 
function. This is in contrast with the absence of impact of the disaster experience 
per se on probability weighting, suggesting that mechanisms unrelated to the dis-
aster itself, possibly associated to social relations and expectations, come into play. 
Crowding out informal aid with highly subsidized public aid might lead to more 
objective weighing of events, with consequences on prevention.
Additionally, we observe no attenuation of the impact of floods when the time lag 
since the last occurrence increases, in the time range available in our data. Flood-
ing may, therefore, have a lasting impact on choices made to deal with disaster risk 
(self-protection and insurance), through risk aversion if not through probability 
weighting. Because flood experience increases risk aversion in the loss domain, a 
sufficiently strong demand for disaster insurance should emerge over time. Self-pro-
tection efforts should also increase, ceteris paribus.
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